K-pop is one of the world’s fastest-growing music genres, and since the 2010s, it has exploded in popularity worldwide. K-pop, short for Korean popular music, originated in South Korea and features a mix of Western music genres made by Korean musicians.
It exploded in popularity following Psy’s 2012 viral hit “Gangnam Style” and has continued to grow, with groups such as Blackpink and BTS achieving international relevance.
Now, in 2026, K-pop continues to grow in popularity. For example, in 2026, K-pop won its first Grammy award, with “Golden” from the movie KPop Demon Hunters winning in the Best Song for Visual Media category (Faulkner, cat. 74).
These developments demonstrate that K-pop is no longer a niche genre but a permanent fixture in the global music industry. This success is widely attributed to the K-pop industry’s corporate nature and its ability to mass-produce popular music. The industry is unique among music genres in that it is largely manufactured by entertainment companies.
Unlike, for example, an American music artist, who often starts their career on their own and gains popularity over time, K-pop artists sign up to be trained by a company and debut as a group with other trainees. This raises the question of how these unorthodox strategies for creating music impact both the musicians and the fans of the genre.
Ultimately, the extensive commercialization of the K-pop industry has created an extremely efficient and internationally successful product, but this same efficiency creates a system that manufactures emotional attachment, creates heavy performance demands, and restructures being a fan into a monetized and competitive ecosystem.
It is important to understand how the parties involved are affected by the system, as this could lead to beneficial change across the system. This paper will discuss the corporate nature of the K-pop industry, how it affects its musicians and fans, and use a rising girl group as a case study.
Following the 1997 Asian economic crisis, with support from the Korean government, South Korea became a massive culture exporter. Starting with k-dramas and Korean movies, the Korean Wave spread to China and across Asia, and eventually reached Europe and the Americas in the 2000s.
With the rise of social media in the 2010s, the Korean wave eventually expanded to include music.
Since South Korean rapper Psy’s viral hit “Gangnam Style”, K-pop has exploded in popularity and continues to grow to this day. (Jin, pgs. 3-19) Part of what made “Gangnam Style” so popular was its blend of Western and Korean music. The song's western aspects, built from EDM and other popular genres of the time, made it familiar to western audiences, while its Korean nature, being written almost entirely in Korean, and its exaggerated performance style, made it unique.
This hybridization enabled it to become a viral hit (Souders, pg. 4). In essence, “Gangnam Style” laid the groundwork for later K-pop artists and groups to break into the international music scene. This hybrid strategy shows how K-pop’s global expansion was not accidental, but strategic and structured for maximum marketability.
These artists are part of a highly centralized corporate structure. The industry is dominated by four large entertainment companies, known as the Big Four.
Although they share a similar structure, each company emphasizes a distinct strategy and philosophy:
First, JYP Entertainment focuses on performance, choreography, and a “bright” image, with notable groups including Twice, Stray Kids, and Itzy.
YG Entertainment focuses on a hip-hop-oriented “cool” image, featuring groups like Blackpink and Babymonster.
Third is SM Entertainment, which is a more vocal-oriented company that helped to pioneer the industry, featuring legacy groups such as Girls’ Generation and Red Velvet.
Hybe is the biggest and newest company, operating as a conglomerate of independent labels, and focusing on globalization and digital fan interaction, with groups such as BTS, NewJeans, and Le Sserafim under its umbrella (Stoll, par. 2-3).
These companies control almost every aspect of the music-making process, from production to training, and even songwriting.
The K-pop system is sometimes compared to a factory for its ability to mass-produce popular artists and music with an emphasis on efficiency and standardization.
In order to become a K-pop idol, a prospect must first be accepted into a trainee program. To do so, prospects must participate in massive company auditions, with most children auditioning as early as ten years old (Sunio, par. 2). Should they be accepted, they must undergo years of training, during which they will rigorously practice dancing and singing.
For example, boy band Bigbang’s G-Dragon spent 11 years training with 2 different companies: five with SM and six with YG.
Finally, if they are lucky, the idol will debut with a group when their company deems them ready (Sunio, par. 5).
The music is produced by a large team of in-house producers, who focus on creating polished and standardized music. Next, a team of choreographers will usually create a music video and dance to accompany the song.
This is one of the most important aspects of K-pop that differentiates it from other music genres. Whereas other genres, such as rap, have moved away from music videos, K-pop is different in its reliance on them in order to promote its music.
For example, the choreographed dances for songs like “Spaghetti” by Le Sserafim have helped to popularize the song through platforms like TikTok, further extending promotion.
Finally, the system employs heavy monetization of all aspects of the process. Everything you can think of is sold. For instance, you can buy albums, photocards, fan interactions, concert tickets,
This commercialization has a heavy impact on performers, as the structure of the system often emphasizes a high-stress environment that can have a negative effect on idols' mental and physical well-being.
For one, idols often have incredibly busy schedules, and an idol, on average, sleeps 4 hours, dropping to 1-2 hours during tours, with 6 hours considered a good night’s rest. This is due to the intense scheduling that they have to go through. The average idol will have many marketing, fan interaction, training, singing, and interviewing duties during a single day (Saeji 3).
For example, when asked about her sleep schedule, idol Minyoung from K-pop group BB Girls stated that,
“Recently we've been only getting 1-2 hours of sleep per day but today we were able to sleep 4 hours” (“Brave Girls”, par. 3 ).
They were also surprised that four hours of sleep was not enough.
These extreme schedules are a result of the industry’s commercial nature, which depends on constant availability to maintain relevance. Furthermore, the normalization of sleep deprivation shows how, because of the system they are in, productivity is prioritized over well-being in order to maximize revenue.
Additionally, the attitude towards mental health in Korea is one of skepticism. In Korea, there is often a negative attitude towards mental health. This is a result of socially ingrained misconceptions about mental health, with many in Korea viewing individuals with mental health issues, specifically depression, as “not as intelligent, trustworthy, or productive as those without,” and that they should not be allowed to supervise children (Saeji 5).
This society-wide viewpoint could lead to internalization of these views by individuals with mental health issues, resulting in an even further mental health decline for those individuals.
This, combined with the industry’s extreme performance demands, creates a scenario where idols are discouraged from seeking mental health support, as their emotional vulnerability is often suppressed to maintain public image and profitability.
These are compounded by the extreme standards that K-pop idols must live up to.
In order to become and remain an idol, idols must maintain a perfect public and physical image. There are strict beauty, behavior, and performance expectations. These expectations are not only enforced after debut, but also during the trainee stage.
For example, singer-songwriter Ejae, starting at age 11, was an idol trainee for over a decade with SM before her contract was allowed to expire due to her height and her inability to fit, “a very specific vision and sonic sound” (De Guzman, par. 4).
This demonstrates how the industry will focus on marketability and standardization over art, filtering out trainees who do not align with the industry’s commercial standards.
Additionally, idols often have very little control over their lives if what they want contradicts their agency’s wants, as agencies often strictly control artists’ image and identity.
Finally, because of the replaceability of idols, stepping out of line often results in ejection. For example, shortly after her debut, idol Kim Ga-ram of Le Sserafim was ejected from the group after allegations of bullying emerged. Once the media started running with the story that Kim was a bully, she quickly became a pariah.
Despite heavy debate over the allegations, Kim was terminated by Hybe, and Le Sserafim continued without its sixth member. Kim would later release evidence confirming that she was just defending a friend. Still, by then, it was too late, as her public image had been ruined by the scandal (Kim, sec. 3).
Ultimately, Kim’s removal demonstrates that agencies will prioritize public opinion over their idols, reinforcing the idea that idols are replaceable components in a larger system.
Additionally, as the public faces of K-pop and often Korean culture as a whole, idols are often subjected to intense public scrutiny.
A particular phenomenon within the K-pop industry is that of the sasaeng fan, which is a South Korean term for an obsessive fan who invades the privacy of an idol, often associated with stalking (Lansky, par. 11). This is due to the manufactured intimacy that is prevalent within the genre, where agencies create an illusion of a relationship by encouraging constant accessibility and visibility. As a result, a small minority of fans conclude that they are entitled to the idol and begin stalking idols and violating their personal boundaries.
For example, Nayeon of Twice has, since 2019, had a German fan who has repeatedly stalked and harassed her. Twice’s agency, JYP, filed a lawsuit against the fan after he attempted to harass her on a flight, leaked fellow Twice member Chaeyoung’s phone number online, and even went to a prominent neighborhood in Seoul, the capital of South Korea, where he thought she lived and asked people in the area if they knew where she was (Ryall, par. 4, 8-9, 19).
As this is a unique phenomenon within the K-pop industry, this demonstrates how the commercial nature of the industry encourages this type of behavior, as the illusion of closeness with an idol created by the industry encourages some fans to invade the privacy of the idols.
Also, again, due to the importance of public image and perceived availability, idols are greatly discouraged or even banned altogether from having romantic relationships. Agencies want fans to believe that they have a relationship with the idol and that they are at least somewhat romantically obtainable (Newkey-Burden, par. 8). This is done to drive attachment and, as a result, increase revenue. When a K-pop idol is found to be in a romantic relationship, fans often accuse them of “betrayal”. For example, when Karina of K-pop girl group Aespa was found to be in a relationship with South Korean actor Lee Jae-wook, she was asked by fans why, “the love given to you by your fans was not enough,” and was forced to issue an apology, where she stated that she was, “sorry to fans for ‘surprising you greatly’ and promised to show a ‘more mature and hardworking side’ in the future” (Newkey-Burden, par. 1-3). This shows how idols are treated as emotionally and romantically available, and when that illusion is disrupted, backlash often follows, reinforcing the idea that idols’ personal lives are secondary to their brand image and profitability. This illustrates how commercialization extends to not just music, but also an idol’s identity and relationships. Ultimately, this stress can often be damaging for idols. This was addressed by Rosé of BLACKPINK, who, when asked about love on a podcast, became visibly distressed as she discussed how answering that question the wrong way could lead to backlash from fans and broke down slightly, stating that, “It makes me sad for a lot of the industry… Just because I was from a K-pop group doesn't mean I am a different type of human being…everyone's human” (Ocho, par. 6-9). Rosé’s comment shows how dehumanizing it is to be an idol, and as a result of the system, they are treated not as individuals but almost as public commodities.
Unfortunately, this commercialization can not only cause extreme stress and burnout for idols, but also, in some cases, death. Due to a combination of all issues discussed above, from high stress to mental health stigma in Korea, on December 18, 2017, Jonghyun of K-pop boyband SHINee committed suicide via carbon monoxide poisoning in his apartment (Saeji 2). His death demonstrates that the commercial pressures of the K-pop system can have massive consequences. While not entirely responsible for his death, it is evident that commercialization helped to create the environment that made his mental issues harder to address. In this sense, his death emphasizes the cost of putting a human being into a system primarily designed to maximize profit and be globally successful. It is also a reminder to audiences that behind the polished performances and perfect public image, there is immense psychological strain that goes unseen.
While it might seem like this only affects idols, fans are also affected by this commercialization. Through livestreams, fan calls, and personalized messaging, idols are encouraged to appear emotionally close to all fans at scale, creating parasocial relationships that reinforce attachment. For example, agencies often create groups via elimination-style gameshows, with a notable example being the show Sixteen being used to create the K-pop girl group Twice (Sixteen). This drives emotional attachment, as before music is even made, fans get to see their idols’ personalities and watch them survive hard competitions and root them on as they get through the show. It creates a heavy emotional attachment before the group is even created, driving sales and increasing the likelihood of the group’s financial success, as they already have a dedicated fanbase. Additionally, because of the monetization of the industry, fans are encouraged to spend vast amounts of money buying merchandise, albums, and fan interactions in order to show loyalty to their favorite idols or groups. Furthermore, fandom is often made competitive, as fans of groups are pitted against each other, with online fan wars being driven by charts, records, and awards. Ultimately, all of these factors often lead to burnout, fans reaching breaking points, or a toxic fandom. An example of this would be when Yunjin of Le Sserafim, during a live-streamed fan call, received a prerecorded message of a “fan” berating her for allegedly giving preferential treatment to other fan sites and not to them, even though the “fan” spent a lot of money on her. The “fan” also threatened Yunjin, stating that if this behavior continued, the fan would switch to only being a fan of Kazuha, another member of Le Sserafim. Yunjin looked physically uncomfortable, but still ended the call with a smile and acted professionally (Cherrie, par. 1-2). This interaction demonstrates how commercialization blurs the line between support and entitlement. Because access to idols is so monetized, financial investment can be seen by some fans as a way to get preferential treatment. In this case, the “fan” threatening to stop supporting Yunjin is a demonstration of the combination of emotional attachment and financial spending, making fandom transactional rather than just appreciative. At the same time, Yunjin being forced to deal with this individual professionally despite clear discomfort demonstrates how the idols often have to deal with the consequences of the system. In summary, commercialization reshapes fandom into a competitive and monetized culture where emotional investment is turned into profit.
A particularly interesting case of this commercial model is Katseye, a six-member “global” girl group composed of members from the United States, the Philippines, South Korea, and Switzerland. While not really a K-pop group, Katseye was formed through a collaboration between Hybe and Geffen Records, an American record company responsible for managing acts such as Olivia Rodrigo and Camila Cabello (Chappell, par. 2-3). This gives Katseye the advantages of the American music industry’s connections and money, but also the Korean music industry’s efficiency and training process. Essentially, Katseye was designed from birth as a corporate product for a global audience, demonstrating how international the industry has become. Similar to Sixteen, the group was formed through an elimination-style program, The Debut: Dream Academy, which allowed fans to watch the contestants, train, compete, and face elimination, with the fans even being able to vote on who would make the final roster (Dream Academy). This format created emotional investment before any music was even released. This ensured that the group already had an established, loyal fanbase. Additionally, as the training process was highly publicized, the emotional and physical strain was exposed, showing how resilience is required and one of the job requirements. From its beginning, Katseye’s development has been intertwined with brand deals and a global focus. Strategic partnerships enabled by Geffen’s industry connections with companies such as Gap (“Gap Denim”) have allowed the group to not only work as musicians but also as lifestyle influencers and fashion ambassadors. Despite existing for only two years with no official album releases, the group has found success, with their song “Gabriela” peaking at #21 on the Billboard Hot 100 and being Grammy-nominated (“Katseye”). Their success illustrates how this commercial model can accelerate global recognition. Rather than slowly entering the market and building a fanbase over time, Katseye entered the market with heavy backing as a music-making corporate entity that was primed for success. Overall, Katsetye represents the globalization and commercialization trends that have been happening throughout the industry at their peak.
The extensive commercialization of the K-pop industry has definitely transformed it into one of the most efficient and successful music industries in the world. Its strategic globalization, corporate structure, and strategic use of emotional attachment have created a factory that systematically produces competent music groups. However, this same efficiency creates intense performance demands, blurred personal boundaries, and heavily affects both idols and fans as participants in a high-profit industry. These extreme pressures and their effects on humans can be devastating, as seen with Jonghyun. However, recent developments may suggest that change is coming within the industry. For example, there are artists like Ejae who found success outside of the traditional idol industry after being filtered out by the system demonstrate that creativity can thrive outside of the system (Cho, par. 6-8). Additionally, many fans have become aware of the stress that idols face and have come out demanding change, such as when fans were critical of Le Sserafim’s management for not screening the angered fan before allowing them to speak with Yunjin (Cherrie, par. 3). Finally, Katseye’s decision to let one of its members, Manon, take an indefinite hiatus to prioritize her well-being may show that management within the industry is becoming more understanding and less demanding of its idols (Rawnsley, par. 1-6). While these scenarios do not change the overall structure of the industry, they do suggest that increased awareness of the issues within the industry may lead to greater accountability. Ultimately, K-pop’s commercial nature has been like a double-edged sword— simultaneously its greatest strength and its biggest challenge. The system is capable of producing global superstars, but also puts a dangerous amount of pressure on those stars to perform and on their fans to support them. The industry has grown so much since the beginning of globalization, with “Gangnam Style” in 2012. The future of K-pop will depend on whether or not the industry can continue to produce global success without sacrificing the well-being of the individuals who make it all possible.
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